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MASS INCARCERATION: THE 
OBSTRUCTION OF JUDGES 
TRACIE A. TODD* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Mass incarceration is a big and well-recognized problem nationwide. There is 
widespread agreement that too many people are being incarcerated for too long. 
State and federal legislators have passed legislation aimed at reducing rates of 
incarceration. In 2018, Congress responded to this crisis through the passage of a 
criminal justice reform bill known as “The First Step Act” that implements 
reforms aimed at reducing incarceration rates in federal prisons for non-violent 
criminal offenders.1  In academic and policy circles, the topic of mass 
incarceration has been widely debated. Judges, of course, play a role in that 
process. Yet, very little attention has been paid in public discourse to what judges 
think about their role in sentencing, and how it relates to mass incarceration. 
State and federal judges are responsible for adjudicating criminal cases, and 
most importantly imposing sentences. But state courts impose most criminal 
sentences. In 2017, roughly 14 million or 95 percent of criminal cases were filed 
in state court systems, compared to 75,861 in federal court.2 This statistic 
demonstrates the importance of state courts in any discussion relating to mass 
incarceration. In this study I interviewed thirty-three judges in starkly different 
jurisdictions—Alabama and Massachusetts. Alabama and Massachusetts have 
vastly different rates of incarceration. Alabama has one of the highest 
incarceration rates in the country, while Massachusetts has one of the lowest. The 
study reveals several factors that may attribute the differences in incarceration 
rates to the institutional and political contexts in which these judges work and 
how it may affect their decisions. 
According to the United States Bureau of Justice 2018 statistics, an estimated 
2 million people were imprisoned in facilities across the country. The United 
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 1.  Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194(2018). 
 2.  NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (2018). 
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States incarcerates 693 people for every 100,000 Americans on average, placing 
the United States as the eleventh highest incarcerator in the world.3 Alabama 
itself is within the top five highest incarcerators globally while Massachusetts is 
within the bottom five in the United States, and approximately sixtieth in the 
world.4 
There are roughly 5 million people living in the State of Alabama according 
to the U.S. Census Bureau. Approximately 26.8 percent of the state’s population 
identified as African American; 4.2 percent identified as Hispanic or Latino; and 
65 percent of the population identified as White only.5 In 2016, nearly 30,000 
people were sentenced to the Alabama Department of Corrections, or ADOC.6 
African Americans made up roughly 54 percent of the inmates housed in ADOC 
facilities as well as community corrections, federal, other states, and county jail 
custody.7 Alabama does not systematically account for inmates who identify 
ethnically or racially as Hispanic or Latino. Instead, it seems that this group is 
classified as “White” or “Other.”8 Although incarceration rates have declined, 
Alabama still incarcerates approximately 987 people for every 100,000 
Alabamians, with prison inmate capacities exceeding 180 percent in recent years.9 
As one Alabama judge opined, “In other communities the impact of race [is] 
harder to pinpoint, but it’s pretty easy to pinpoint in Alabama.” 
In contrast, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with a population of 
approximately 7 million incarcerates roughly 330 people for every 100,000 
Massachusettsans.10 Although Massachusetts has lower incarceration rates, the 
commonwealth is “fairly high up because of racial disparities.” In Massachusetts, 
8.6 percent of the population identified as African American; 11.5 percent 
identified as Hispanic or Latino and 73 percent of the population identified as 
White only.11 African Americans accounted for approximately 27 percent of the 
prison population.12 Roughly 25 percent of prison inmates self-reported as 
 
 3.  Peter Wagner & Alison Walsh, States of Incarceration: The Global Context, THE PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (June 16, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2016.html 
[https://perma.cc/PC4G-MNDK]. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, ALABAMA: RACE & HISPANIC ORIGIN (2018). 
 6.  ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2016). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 
MANUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR, 2018 (2018). 
 9.  Chris Mai & Ram Subramanian, The Price of Prisons: Examining State Spending Trends, 2010–
2015, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (May 2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-
assets/downloads/Publications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/legacy_downloads/the-price-
of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AHT-PJ3V].  
 10.  Wagner & Walsh, supra note 3. 
 11.  MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS PRISON POPULATION TRENDS, 2016 (2017). 
 12.  Id. 
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Hispanic.13 Like Alabama, more than half of the Massachusetts prison population 
is comprised of racial minorities.14 
II 
THE FRAMEWORK 
Studies of criminal justice reform have traditionally examined the impact of 
sentencing disparities, systematic deficiencies, inadequate funding, and political 
mandates on mass incarceration trends in the United States. Historically, these 
studies exclusively analyze the judicial decision making of unelected federal 
judges. However, the literature is substantively void of introspective 
contributions from key participants in the criminal justice system—state judges. 
A closer look at the role of state judges in the context of contemporary mass 
incarceration provides myriad academic and practical applications, especially 
where there are substantive nonconformities. The State of Alabama and the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts squarely fit within this paradigm. 
In both Alabama and Massachusetts, the district and trial courts have 
jurisdiction over criminal sentencing. Although there are some institutional 
differences in the authorities vested in each jurisdiction, judges in these courts 
are responsible for sentencing criminal offenders. According to the Alabama 
Administrative Office of Courts, there are 245 circuit and district court judges 
vested with jurisdiction to decide criminal cases.15 Judges in Alabama are 
selected through a partisan election process for a six-year term.16 Political pundits 
describe Alabama as a conservative, red state associated politically with the 
Republican Party.17 In Massachusetts, there are 344 comparative judicial offices, 
including 249 superior and district court judges vested with jurisdiction in   
criminal   cases.18 Massachusetts judges are selected by gubernatorial appointment 
for a permanent term with a mandatory retirement age of seventy. Massachusetts 
is described politically as a socially progressive, blue state associated politically 
with the Democratic Party.19 
I individually interviewed a total of thirty-three Alabama and Massachusetts 
trial and district court judges. The judges were interviewed with the stated 
condition of anonymity. I gave preliminary instructions regarding the study topic 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  This information was provided by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts via a direct 
email request to the human resources department. 
 16.  ALABAMA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF COURTS, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANNUAL REPORT & 
STATISTICS (2017), (on file with the Journal). 
 17.  See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PARTY AFFILIATION BY STATE (2014); Pat Roberts & Mark 
Begich, How Red or Blue is Your State?, THE HILL (Oct. 24, 2014), https://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-
box/house-races/221721-how-red-or-blue-is-your-state [https://perma.cc/M2ZA-Y9F2].  
 18.  MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT, MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT ANNUAL DIVERSITY 
REPORT (2017). Boston Municipal Court also has concurrent jurisdiction over some felony offenses. 
However, there is no comparable structure in Alabama. 
 19.  See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 18; Roberts & Begich, supra note 18. 
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and expressly explained my role as researcher to counteract assumptions about 
my knowledge of the subject matter as a sister judge. All judges gave extremely 
candid and complete answers. During the interviews, the words “conservative” 
and “progressive” peppered the responses in political and social contexts. 
Focusing on introspective judicial decision making and institutional features, I 
started the interviews asking for a broad definition of criminal justice reform to 
establish a framework for the judges and identify common themes. There were 
four main topics for the judges to consider: 1) Responsibility for criminal justice 
reform; 2) Effectiveness of current reform efforts; 3) The judge as participant in 
reform; and 4) The judicial selection process. Nevertheless, some judges, 
especially my Alabama colleagues, tended to presume my awareness. In these 
instances, I gave intermittent explanations of my role as researcher. However, 
the interviews, designed to last one to one-and-a half hours, averaged forty-five 
minutes to an hour. 
Most interviews were conducted by phone. As a current member of the 
bench, I drafted questions based on existing literature and commonly expressed 
concerns among colleagues. I was looking for patterns in the responses primarily 
from judges outside of my jurisdiction to counter slants toward possible 
preconceptions based on jurisdictional homogeneousness. Alabama judges 
voluntarily responded to my direct email request. Requests for participation in 
Massachusetts were made through two intermediaries, a court official and a law 
professor. More Alabama judges were interviewed than Massachusetts judges. 
More trial judges were interviewed than district judges in both jurisdictions. Still, 
the voluntary response created a diverse pool with varying age, race, gender, 
experience and political affiliation. 
The judges related factors that may correlate high rates of incarceration with 
judicial attitudes and sentencing practices. The interviews provided vital 
information explaining perceived obstructions caused by politically motivated 
legislative mandates, inadequate funding, and the respective judicial selection 
processes. The responses are presented in aggregate. Anonymous quotations are 
included to clearly express areas of consensus and jurisdiction specific 
discussions. As a member of this professional group, I also added quotations as a 
quality control measure to assure the reader that the expressed views are solely 











TODD - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019  4:51 PM 
No. 2 2019] MASS INCARCERATION 195 
III 
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SELECTION PROCESS 
One of the most obvious factors to consider in the discussion of mass 
incarceration between the Alabama and Massachusetts justice systems is the 
starkly different judicial selection processes. Alabama judges are selected by 
contested partisan election. Judicial candidates for office at all levels of the 
judicial system are required to qualify with a political party or adhere to 
requirements for independent candidates.20 For over two hundred years, judges 
in Massachusetts have been selected by gubernatorial appointment to serve a 
lifetime appointment, now with a mandatory retirement age of seventy.21 The 
opposing judicial selection processes may be the most prominent factor when 
considering the diverging incarceration rates. 
All Alabama judges rebuffed or tepidly considered the idea of an appointment 
process. Massachusetts judges homogeneously rejected the proposition of a 
contested election as a judicial selection method. Nevertheless, the responses 
suggested that the judicial selection processes may influence sentencing decisions 
that affect the respective rates of incarceration. 
Participants affiliated with the Democratic Party made up 52 percent of the 
judges interviewed from Alabama, and the remaining 48 percent affiliate with the 
Republican Party. Although Massachusetts judges are appointed, 60 percent of 
 
 20.  ALABAMA LAW INSTITUTE, ALABAMA ELECTION HANDBOOK 2017-2018 (2018). 
 21.  AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION: MASSACHUSETTS 
(2014). 
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the participants in this study were appointed by Republican governors. The 
remaining 40 percent by Democratic Governors. 
 
A. The Election 
Alabama judges commonly believe that the partisan component of the 
judicial selection process may negatively influence sentencing decisions and 
contribute directly to the state’s overcrowded prison system.22 Generally, 
Alabama judges pointed to the partisan component of the selection process as 
problematic, or at least concerning, in a state where straight party voting 
dominates judicial races. One judge summarized this notion stating, “when 
you’re…associated with [a] particular party…it’s just not a good visual for the 
general public…it seems ridiculous on its face to say that you’re one or the other 
when you’re supposed to be totally unbiased.” Described in religious terms by 
another judge, “judges should be non-denominational.” The significance of this 
acknowledgement relates directly to judicial attitudes among Alabama judges 
about sentencing practices. Although expressed objectively, most Alabama 
judges believed that “there is some correlation between” the judicial selection 
process in Alabama, “how [judges] impose punishment,” and Alabama’s prison 
population. Democratic judges inferred that their Republican counterparts 
experience more community pressure to be “tough on crime.” One judge candidly 
described this inference in a distinctly political science context: 
[A] judge is going to serve in the community that he’s a part of by and large…[I]f that 
is a more moderate or liberal or conservative community, then typically that judge, will 
 
 22.  Michael H. LeRoy, Do Partisan Elections of Judges Produce Unequal Justice When Courts 
Review Employment Arbitrations?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1569, 1569–1616 (2010). 
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serve the needs [of that community]. We don’t have our own goal; we have to serve the 
goals of our constituents. Judges are [required] by law as far as what they can do, but 
for the most part they are serving the people of that community. So, you have to sort of 
acquiesce in a sense to what that community needs and what they want you to do as an 
elected official. 
In affirming this point, there were repeated references to fears of special 
interest groups running “Willie Horton” political advertisements. The premise of 
the “Willie Horton” ad, ironically based on a Massachusetts case, centers on a 
judge releasing an offender from custody who then commits a heinous crime after 
release. In summary, one judge explained: 
In six years [judges] stand for reelection and some lawyer out there decides…to say…he 
is soft on crime...she’s talking about rehabilitating somebody who’s a rapist, who’s a 
murderer, who’s a robber, you know. So, if you note that in the back of your head and 
you know that another lawyer could use that in a campaign…you’re going to be a little 
bit more cautious about that. May not be quite as ambitious…If I lose the election, then, 
you know, I don’t have a platform at all to try to help, educate the community, educate 
other lawyers, judges [or] the legislature as to what needs to be done in this criminal justice 
system. 
Although Alabama judges acknowledge that there is likely a correlation 
between the role of a judge as a partisan political figure and the overcrowded 
prisons in Alabama, the judges unanimously expressed contentment with some 
form of an election process. Each judge was generally “opposed to appoint[ing] 
judges” citing perceived hindrances to minorities and socio-economically 
disadvantaged Whites being appointed by a governor. Therefore, most Alabama 
judges believe that the selection of judges is “within the province of the people.” 
However, there was a consensus among Alabama judges that partisanship and 
the public demand for tough-on-crime punishment probably influence sentencing 
decisions and thereby contribute to incarceration rates. 
B. The Appointment 
Under Massachusetts law, “[a]ll judicial officers . . . shall be nominated and 
appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the council.”23 
In 1975 a formalized merit-based selection process was created for the appointment 
of judges.24 Massachusetts judges unanimously and enthusiastically touted the 
judicial appointment process. The judges attribute the quality of the 
Massachusetts judiciary to the rigors of the merit selection process. The judges 
expressed in varying degrees an aversion to the idea of judicial elections. Most 
judges believe that the judicial appointment process insulates them from the 
political pressures associated with answering to an electorate, “no one can either 
implicitly or explicitly threatened you with your job”. Likewise, Massachusetts 
judges describe an independence that allows them to exercise judicial discretion 
without fear of electoral retribution with respect to sentencing decisions. 
 
 23.  MASS CONST. ch. 2, art. IX. 
 24.  Martin W. Healy, A Guide to the Massachusetts Judicial Selection Process: The Making of a 
Judge, MASSACHUSETTS BAR ASSOCIATION (2015), https://www.massbar.org/docs/default-
source/advocacy/mjsp-3-ed.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/7M2Y-9PQ6].  
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“Massachusetts judges are very proud and feel very strongly that the [merit 
selection process] gives us the opportunity to be independent [and] true to the 
law without worrying about public clamor.” There was an overwhelming 
presumption among Massachusetts judges that the gubernatorial appointment 
process insulates the judiciary from political considerations that may influence 
sentencing decisions, which corresponds with decreasing incarceration rates. 
IV 
RACE AND SOCIOECONOMICS 
In addition to variances in judicial selection, considerations of race and 
socioeconomics are also routinely debated in the context of mass incarceration. 
Theoretically, neither race nor socio-economics should affect sentencing in a 
blind justice system. But the responses given by the judges suggested that these 
factors are considered in sentencing decisions at least in the margins and where 
judges have discretion. 
It is well settled that racial minorities, especially African Americans and 
people of Latino descent are incarcerated at higher rates than Whites.25 
According to the United States Census Bureau, in 2017 13.3 percent of the 
American population identified as African American; 17.8 percent identified as 
Hispanic or Latino and 61 percent identified as White only. However, in July of 
2018, African Americans made up almost 40 percent of the total prison 
population.26 In examining criminal justice reform in this context, there was 
consensus among judges in both jurisdictions that “disparit[ies] in sentencing” 
serve as a primary contributor to mass incarceration. Therefore, reducing “racial 
disparities in sentencing” was deemed an indispensable aim in reforming the 
criminal justice system and reducing incarceration rates. Nationally, opposing 
factions cite varying economic, social or political rationales in support of criminal 
justice reform and the need for reduced incarceration rates.27 
The bi-partisan debate relating to mass incarceration has been fueled to some 
degree by the growing opioid crisis in the U.S.28 There was a presumption among 
the judges that the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing should not be 
“influenced by a person’s race, economic status or the implicit bias of the judges.” 
The criminal justice system should be “blind to race and other extraneous” 
considerations. But race was also discussed in direct relation to the government 
and public efforts to reform the criminal justice system in response to this crisis. 
In summarizing a viewpoint shared by others, one judge explicitly associated the 
 
 25.  Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT (June 2016), https://www.senencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-
Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KM9-CN8Y].  
 26.  FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE RACE STATISTICS (2018). 
 27.  Cameron Smith, We Need Better Solutions than ‘Big Government’ Incarceration, AL.COM (Mar. 
16, 2017), http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/03/we_can_do_better_than_the_big.html 
[https://perma.cc/6A44-BM3H].  
 28.  James G. Hodge et al., Redefining Public Health Emergencies: The Opioid Epidemic,” 58 
JURIMETRICS J. 1, 1–17 (2017). 
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legislative efforts to combat opioids with the drug epidemic now becoming a 
“White problem.” This viewpoint centers on the crack epidemic, which 
disproportionately affected the African American community in the early 1980’s 
and 1990’s, when defendants charged with crack related offenses “were getting 
some long sentences.” Another judge explained, “[o]nce [drugs] became a white 
problem . . . we weren’t just locking people up to solve the problem.” Disparate 
enrollment in deferred sentencing programs was also cited in relation to race and 
sentencing practices. A sampling of Massachusetts Drug Court programs 
revealed that 87 percent of Drug Court participants were White, even when the 
court is in a predominately African American community.29 According to one 
Massachusetts judge, “There’s a lack of diversity in our drug courts . . . that’s 
tough for people to . . . take a real look at the issue of race[.]” 
In addition to racial disparities, each judge referred in varying ways to “a 
direct relation with poverty and crime.”30 According to the United States Census 
Bureau, the median income in Alabama is $44,758.00, and educational 
attainment is below the national average. Correspondingly, Alabama has one 
of the highest violent crime rates in the United States.31 Conversely, the median 
income in Massachusetts is $70,954.00, and educational attainment is above the 
national average.32 Likewise, Massachusetts has an average or below average 
crime rate.33 Relating to race, judicial decision making may be influenced to some 
degree by the reality that “judges bring their own experiences with them.” In 
considering matters of race and socio-economics in the context of judicial 
attitudes about criminal justice reform, one judge candidly explained: 
[Y]our personal life experiences are [your] teacher and if you have never been around 
groups of people less fortunate than yourself or you have never even had the 
opportunity to experience groups of people less fortunate than yourself, then you are 
shaped…that’s your world. I think it’s hard for people to understand folk less fortunate 
than them. Most of the time the only interaction [judges] have with people of color or 
people who are less fortunate than them are in these jobs and it’s just hard for them to 
care about criminal justice reform. 
V 
OBSTRUCTIVE LEGISLATION 
While judges are authorized to exercise some discretion in sentencing, the 
discretion is not unconstrained. It has long been concluded that the mass 
 
 29.  Shira Schoenburg, Participants in Massachusetts’ Drug Courts are Overwhelmingly White, 
MASSLIVE (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/participants_in_ 
massachusetts.html [https://perma.cc/8E3D-X8JJ].  
 30.  Stephanie Hong, Say Her Name: The Black Woman and Incarceration, 19 GEO. J. GENDER & 
L. 619, 627 (2018). 
 31.  Leada Gore, Alabama’s Place on the List of Most Dangerous States, AL.COM (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://www.al.com/news/2018/11/alabamas-place-on-the-list-of-most-dangerous-states.html 
[https://perma.cc/7H7W-943K].  
 32.  UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, MASSACHUSETTS: QUICK FACTS (2018). 
 33.  FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING STATISTICS, 2016 
(2019). 
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incarceration phenomena in the United States occurred as a direct result of the 
pivot from a rehabilitative criminal justice system to a retributive, draconian 
criminal justice system.34 Even a glancing analysis of mass incarceration in all fifty 
states confirms incarceration rates higher than those of countries and territories 
internationally condemned as human rights violators.35  The retributive policies 
of the 1990’s War on Drugs and its offshoots placed federal and state legislative 
“tough on crime” mandates primarily on judges, especially state judges.36 
A. Tough-on-Crime 
Mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines have become the most 
prominently scrutinized tough-on-crime mandate, and widely credited for 
exponential increases in incarceration rates. Under the mandatory minimum 
sentencing structure, judges have no discretion in the minimum prison sentence 
imposed for certain crimes. Judges in both jurisdictions unanimously attributed 
high prison incarceration rates in significant part to tough on crime mandates. 
“Some judges are of the view that if not for that mandatory minimum, they might 
come up with a different sentence that might be more appropriate for the 
particular offender.” Mandatory minimum sentencing was perceived among 
judges in both jurisdictions as a practical obstruction to effective sentencing 
strategies. Mandatory minimum sentencing was described by one judge as 
“shift[ing] discretion from the judge to the prosecutor.” The judges intuitively 
used low level drug crimes as the foremost example of the negative impact on 
prison populations caused by mandatory minimum sentencing. In discussing this 
universal frustration with the adverse effects of mandatory minimum sentencing, 
one judge explained: 
“We first […] have to decide what we’re going do. Are we going to treat everybody as 
if they are a dangerous major drug dealer? Are we going to carve out for those persons 
who are addicted[,] who are as much a victim of the drug? Are we going to incarcerate 
them for the duration of their life as we would a major dangerous [offender]? 
On this point, there was consensus that mandatory minimum sentencing 
related to drug offenses, mental illness, and “spin off” crimes creates an 
unworkable mandate on judges. Reportedly, the divesting of discretion here 
impedes the judges’ ability to tailor sentences to specific circumstances. “It’s not 
going to work . . . unless you tailor it to each person’s case individually.” In other 
words, the judges correlate mandatory minimum sentencing with the inability to 
effectively address substance abuse and mental health illness in the criminal 
 
 34.  Albert Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past 
Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–22 (2003); Mark R. Fondacaro, The 
Rebirth of Rehabilitation in Juvenile and Criminal Justice: New Wine in New Bottles, 41 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 697, 697–726 (2015). 
 35.  Wagner & Walsh, supra note 4; New York Times Editorial Board, Justice Reform in the Deep 
South, N. Y. TIMES (May 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/18/opinion/justice-reform-in-the-
deep-south.html [https://perma.cc/UX7C-Z3K4].  
 36.  William N. Clark, The Criminalization of America, 76 THE ALABAMA LAWYER 224, 224–232 
(2015). 
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justice system. In support of this view another judge stated, “[i]f you look at the 
population in the prisons…, overwhelming numbers…have either substance 
abuse or mental illness or both. If you could treat all of that effectively, you could 
close a lot prisons and prevent a lot of crime.” 
B. Judges as Lobbyists 
The judges believed good a legislative-judicial relationship to be critical in the 
creation of legislation that allows them to use their discretion “to help people.”  
The judges collectively acknowledged a subjective role in criminal justice reform 
and reducing incarceration rates. One of the many judges who addressed this 
point affirmed that “[W]e can put a face to it. We see it day in, day out. We see 
individuals. We see the lives that have been destroyed…victims, defendants and 
their families. So . . . it’s personal.” Both Alabama and Massachusetts legislatures 
have recently passed measures to address mass incarceration and the resulting 
fiscal and social burdens placed on each prison system. But the legislation passed 
in each jurisdiction looks different, and so do the legislative-judicial 
relationships.37 
Every judge identified the legislature as having primary responsibility 
because criminal justice reform primarily “lives within the prerogative of the 
legislature.” This presumption was based on the legislature’s power of pen and 
most importantly purse. But  the public’s demand for punishment was uniformly 
identified as the leading influence on legislative decision making and the 
enactment of retributive mandates, making matters of reform “all politics.” When 
discussing perceived impediments to substantive criminal justice reform, across 
the board the judges pointed to the political pressure of legislators being labeled 
“soft on crime.” One judge explained that the Nixonian tough-on-crime mandate 
“plays well with the public and the legislature,” encouraging retention of 
retributive sentencing policies that exponentially increase incarceration rates. 
Generally, judges in both jurisdictions optimistically believed that increased 
awareness among the electorate and legislature would encourage a more 
dramatic shift away from a “tough on crime” approach toward a more effective 
“smart on crime” strategy. The process of educating the legislature revealed 
interesting discussions about the judiciary’s interaction with the legislature. Both 
state and commonwealth cannons of judicial ethics make allowances for judges 
to engage in discussions with legislators and the public on matters concerning the 
court. There are no statutory or ethical constraints on judges initiating contact 
with the legislature to discuss topics relating to sentencing and criminal justice 
reform generally. But the strategies exercised in the jurisdictions are starkly 
different, as is the resulting criminal justice legislation that directly correlates 
with mass incarceration rates. 
Alabama judges described an unorganized hodgepodge of methods used to 
influence legislators. The kaleidoscope of methods included direct contact with 
 
 37.  See Appendices A & B. 
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respective legislators, submission of opinion editorials, lobbyists retained by the 
circuit and district judges’ associations, communications by way of the presiding 
judges of each circuit, and direct appeals to the community through public 
discourse and presentations. There was no consensus among Alabama judges on 
the effectiveness of any one method or combination of methods employed to 
educate lawmakers. Alabama judges, in stark contrast to their commonwealth 
counterparts, described historic and contemporary conflicts in legislature-judicial 
branch relations that have created an “indifference toward the judiciary.” Despite 
an unbridled ability to communicate with legislators, Alabama judges generally 
believed that input from the judiciary was not adequately considered in the most 
recent criminal justice reform legislation. In affirming this point one judge 
explained, “In order for us to get our prison populations down or criminal justice 
reform, if that is important to our state, we’ve all got to talk.” Another judge 
explained, “We need to look at evidence based practices as a basis for the way 
we do the reform.” But the consensus among Alabama judges was that there is 
“a disconnect between the legislature and the judicial branch.” Alabama judges 
universally acknowledged problems with the disjointed legislature-judiciary 
communication processes, coupled with inherent political considerations. There 
was agreement among Alabama judges that critical judicial input in the criminal 
justice legislative process has been impeded. As a result, Alabama judges 
describe criminal justice policies that “play[] well with the public,” but may not 
adequately reduce the state’s prison population. 
Although Massachusetts judges are permitted to individually communicate 
with legislative officials, most did not find such a proposition necessary and gave 
great deference to “tradition.” There was a clear aversion among Massachusetts 
judges to individually engage legislators, telegraphing a rank and file mindset in 
this regard. One Massachusetts judge explained the universal commonwealth 
sentiment stating, “I’ve just never felt comfortable in our role of addressing the 
legislature . . . So we try to let the chiefs of the departments along with the chief 
of the appeals court and the chief of the [Supreme Judicial Court] do the speaking 
for us.” Each Massachusetts judge described a positive relationship between the 
legislature and judiciary. Although there has been “some fluctuation” there has 
been a positive “consistency” with legislature-judiciary relations. Overall, 
Massachusetts judges believe that “there’s a lot of respect for the judiciary and 
that “historically there’s no animosity between branches.” The reported 
amicability between these branches of government may be attributed in part to 
the regulated interbranch communication system. Collectively, Massachusetts 
judges perceived the judiciary to be a respected branch of government. In support 
of this belief one Massachusetts judge explained that “the legislature has tried to 
be very cooperative with us and responsive . . . I think they have[.]” The judiciary 
reportedly had a significant role in the debate and drafting of the 
commonwealth’s most recent criminal justice reform legislation. Supreme 
Judicial Court leaders served as key advisors and liaisons throughout the process. 
The judiciary worked with the Governor, and legislative leaders to introduce 
legislation based on a comprehensive study of the Massachusetts Court System 
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conducted by the Council on State Governments. In affirming this point one 
judge explained, “Our chief justice of the supreme judicial court has been quite 
outspoken about proposing changes in law that would give judges more 
discretion about sentencing [and] make sentencing more evidence based.” 
Massachusetts judges described the judiciary as a non-partisan, respected and co-
equal branch of government that utilizes a uniformed communication system to 
sustain positive legislature-judiciary relations. This perception corresponds with 
the judiciary’s prominent role as a participant in drafting criminal justice reform 
legislation that may prove to effectively reduce incarceration rates. 
VI 
JUDICIAL TRAINING 
Perhaps surprisingly, another factor that may affect sentencing decisions 
among the judges is the training that they receive after taking the bench. Here, 
there was a striking difference between Alabama and Massachusetts judges in 
relation to sentencing decisions and continued judicial education. In both 
jurisdictions, judges who reportedly practiced “little criminal law,” if any, prior 
to becoming a judge discussed the learning curve in this new area of substantive 
law and the importance of judicial education. But, judges with substantial 
criminal law experience also considered judicial training vital for judges to “know 
what to do.” Here deviating practices surfaced creating an interesting 
consideration in the analysis of mass incarceration and sentencing decisions. 
Newly elected judges in Alabama may electively participate in a state 
sponsored orientation that typically commences over a two to five-day period. 
These judges are also encouraged to attend the two-week general jurisdiction 
course at the National Judicial College. The state pays the expenses for this 
training through dedicated funds and scholarships. As announced in 2013, all 
other judges are exempt from continuing judicial education requirements.38 One 
judge explained that training is “not mandatory [in Alabama] because they can’t 
afford to pay for us to go. So, it’s limited.” Nevertheless, the Administrative 
Office of Courts in collaboration with the judicial program committee 
coordinates most of the elective in-state training opportunities for judges at the 
semi-annual state judicial conference. Over the years, Alabama prison reform 
has occupied a vast space in judicial training discussions. But, according to a 
conference presenter, some judges may have been “overwhelmed” by the topic. 
So, “very little criminal law” was offered at recent trainings. As a result, concern 
was expressed that judges are not receiving training on proper application of 
criminal laws especially relating to sentencing. In expressing this view, one 
Alabama judge opined, 
We’re called upon to handle issues of life and death and there is no mandatory 
training…for [ ] judges. [T]here should be mandatory training for us. But even if it’s not 
mandatory, I think most good judges want training and we can’t even get it. I don’t even 
 
 38.  This information came from a set of emails sent at the author’s request to the director for judicial 
training at the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts. 
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think we would need to rewrite laws if we just had adequate training…yearly judicial 
training, but good judicial training, not training that is led by a judge just because he has 
been a judge for 25 years. I mean, good judicial training. 
Another judge explained, 
The state overall does the best that they can do[.] There’s just so many complexities that 
they really can’t educate you on everything…We do a pretty good job. Could we do 
better? Yes, we could always do a better…but maybe it’s up to the department of 
corrections to say, hey, we’re overcrowded. We’ve got these other options for 
sentencing…Responsibility rests with a number of individuals. 
There was little mention of training opportunities outside of the biannual 
state judicial conference and the general jurisdiction course at the National 
Judicial College. Overall, state sponsored training for judges was believed to be 
important for fundamental understanding, accurate implementation of criminal 
laws and sentencing practices that avoid exacerbating incarceration rates. 
In contrast, judicial training in Massachusetts is a combined mandatory and 
elective system. Training for new commonwealth judges includes a two-year 
curriculum that focuses on mentorship, orientation, and in-class presentations on 
relevant subject matter.39 One Massachusetts judge commended the training, 
stating, “I didn’t realize as a lawyer that there was that sort of collegiality and 
support among the judges and that’s impressed the heck out of me.” Senior 
Massachusetts judges attend elective and mandatory “regional meetings like four 
times a year” organized by the judicial leadership. Training on specific subjects 
such as race and implicit bias have been made mandatory for all Massachusetts 
judges. Expenses for judicial training are funded by the state. Additional judicial 
training is offered at the Flaschner Institute, a center established for educating 
commonwealth and federal judges in Massachusetts offering more than thirty-
five training opportunities on different areas of substantive law and specialized 
subject matters throughout the year. In addition to judicial training, the 
Massachusetts Superior Court leadership collaborated efforts between the 
judiciary, prosecutors, defense counsel, the legal academy and the legislature to 
study and develop evidence-based practices for the trial court. In 2016, the 
Massachusetts Superior Court published Best Practices for Individualized 
Evidence-Based Sentencing. The Best Practices guide provides instruction for 
superior court judges to identify 
[F]actors relevant to the imposition of a committed sentence, to alternatives to a 
committed sentence, and to supervision upon release…probation, including use of a 
risk/assessment tool to determine the level of supervision…identify conditions of 
probation that…decrease recidivism; and…probation violations, to ensure that a 
probationer is held accountable in a timely and proportional manner.40 
The Best Practices guide was well received among superior court judges, 
Eepecially those with “very little criminal law” experience prior to taking the 
 
 39.  The information was provided in the 2017 Judicial Education in the Trial Court inter-court 
memorandum disseminated by the chief judges. Memorandum from State Trial Court Chief Judges on 
Judicial Education in the Trial Court (2017) (on file with author). 
 40.  MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT, BEST PRACTICES FOR INDIVIDUALIZED EVIDENCE-
BASED SENTENCING (2016). 
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bench. They described the guideline as helpful. Many explained that it provides 
consistent and proportional sentencing practices across the Massachusetts court 
system. Although this guide is not mandatory, most trial judges find it to be 
helpful and follow the guideline “closely.” For these judges, the Best Practices 
gives “guidance from people who know what works and what doesn’t work” in 
making effective sentencing decisions and reducing the incarceration rate. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
The plight of mass incarceration has forced opposing policy makers at the 
federal and state levels to address specific problems    like    prison    overcrowding, 
albeit    for    varying    philosophical reasons. Conservative-leaning policy makers 
explain the need for criminal justice reform primarily in terms of economic 
hardships.41 Many progressive or liberal-leaning policy makers point to social 
injuries caused by mass incarceration.42 However, it is a generally accepted 
premise across the political spectrum that the current rates of mass incarceration 
are fiscally unsustainable. In other words, “the public doesn’t want to build more 
prisons, [and the] legislature doesn’t have money to build prisons.” 
As a general premise, it can be concluded from this study that legislative 
mandates and institutional features may affect judicial discretion in sentencing. 
The conclusion relates directly to the widely divergent incarceration rates in 
Alabama and Massachusetts. The study revealed variations in attitudes, 
practices and policies that judges as actors in the criminal justice system believe 
to be obstructive to efforts aimed at reducing incarcerations rates. Judges 
perceive themselves as intermediaries between the criminal justice system and 
the communities to which most offenders will be returned. Therefore, any 
genuine effort to effectively reform the criminal justice system and reduce 
prison populations must include substantive involvement of state judges. 
Overcrowded prisons have necessitated reform of the criminal justice system. 
While this study centered on surface level political mandates and institutional 
features, the study of state judges as participants in the criminal justice system is 
vastly unchartered territory. Further study of these key actors in the criminal 
justice system is ripe for original contribution to the literature, and perhaps a 








 41.  Fondacaro, supra note 35. 
 42.  Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 423–468 (2013). 
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Strengthen community-based supervision to reduce 
recidivism. 
 Standardize the use of risk and needs assessments to 
target supervision resources for people who are most 
likely to reoffend, and reduce probation and parole 
officers’ caseloads by prioritizing intense supervision 
for people more likely to reoffend and providing 
limited supervision for people less likely to reoffend. 
 Establish intermediate sanctions to respond to 
technical violations of probation and parole, and allow 
for short jail stays prior to revocation in the range of 
possible sanctions. 
 Improve the quality of Community Corrections 
Programs (CCPs) by creating a new funding standard 
for CCPs that sets appropriation levels based on the 
degree of implementation of evidence-based practices. 
 Allow people on supervision who have lost their 
driver’s licenses as a result of their convictions to apply 
for a driver’s license with limited driving privileges. 
Prioritize prison space for violent and dangerous offenders. 
Divert people convicted of low-level property and drug 
offenses away from prison 
 Create a new Class D felony category for the lowest-
level property and drug offenses, and require sentences 
to CCPs instead of prison. Modify the classification of 
third degree burglary to a nonviolent offense if an 
individual enters an uninhabited, non-domicile building 
and no person is encountered while the crime is being 
committed. 
 Respond to serious technical probation and parole 
violations with 45-day periods of incarceration followed 
by continued supervision. 
Improve efficiency and transparency of the parole decision-
making process 
 Require the parole board to create structured parole 
guidelines, based on current research and best 
practices, to ensure consistency in the factors the parole 
board considers when determining if a person is ready 
for parole.  
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 Mandate that the parole board record and share 
reasons for parole denial with the person who was 
denied parole, the victims, and the Department of 
Corrections (DOC). 
Ensure supervision for everyone upon release from prison, 
and expand victim notification. 
 Require people convicted of a Class C offense—which 
includes property, drug, and person offenses—to serve 
split sentences, which provide a fixed term of 
incarceration and guarantee a period of supervision 
after release from prison or jail. 
 Require that people serving a straight prison sentence 
receive a period of supervision upon release.  
 Complete the development of the electronic victim 
notification system, and expand victim notification 
regarding releases from prison. 
2017 








Repeal of judicial override allowing a judge to impose the 
death penalty when a jury has recommended life 
imprisonment. 
2018  







Increased prison funding by additional $85 million for the 
state prison system over the next two years.  
Nitrogen Execution Bill allows the condemned to choose 
execution by nitrogen hypoxia if lethal injection is 
unavailable, or if they so elect.  
Human Trafficking Bill enhances the penalties already in 
place, increasing the offense to a Class A felony, with a 
minimum jail sentence of ten years.  
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Decriminalize minor offenses: 
 Minor offenses for juveniles—civil infractions and 
first offense misdemeanors with penalties under 6 
months—cannot be the subject of delinquency 
findings 
 Disruptive behavior in school (disturbing assembly or 
disorderly conduct) cannot be the subject of 
delinquency findings (but more serious behavior can 
still be prosecuted); Additionally, schools shall enter 
MOUs with school resource officers defining non-
disciplinary role of school resource officers 
 Repeal offense of being in the presence of heroin 
 Expand scope of good Samaritan protections to 
youth alcohol and to probation violations 
 Specify that use of prescribed drugs and medical 
marijuana, shall not constitute a probation violation 
Divert minor offenses away from prosecution and 
incarceration: 
 Create mechanism for judicial diversion of juveniles 
for less serious offenses 
 Improve and expand mechanism for district court 
diversion of adults 
 Eliminate defunct requirement for probation 
certification of diversion programs 
 Eliminate age restrictions on diversion 
 Exclude serious offenses from diversion 
 Assure that victims are heard in diversion 
decisions 
 Create legal/administrative framework to expand use 
of restorative justice programs for diversion of both 
juveniles and adults 
 Require judges to make written findings before 
imposing a sentence of incarceration of primary 
caretakers of children 
 Make drug diversion more workable by making it 
possible for a wider range of professionals to make 
findings of dependence 
 Preserve powers of District Attorneys to divert cases 
and manage their own diversion programs 
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 Require District Attorneys to develop diversion 
programs for veterans and people with mental illness 
or substance use disorders. 
Reform Bail to reduce unnecessary incarceration: 
 Codify main holding of the Brangan case – judge 
should consider financial capability of defendant and 
set bail only as high as needed to assure defendant’s 
return 
 Require that if judge needs to set unaffordable bail to 
assure return, the judge make written findings that 
the Commonwealth’s interest in assuring return 
outweighs the harm of detention to the individual and 
their family 
 Allow judges to use community corrections facilities 
for pre-trial release (consistent with CSG report) 
 Create pre-trial services unit to remind defendants of 
upcoming court dates using modern messaging 
approaches 
 Create commission on bail to monitor change and 
suggest further improvements 
Repeal/limit mandatory minimums for non-opiate, non-
weight retail drug offenses: 
 Limit applicability of school zone law to cases 
involving guns or minors 
 Eliminate mandatory for second offense class B 
(make fentanyl class A) 
 Eliminate mandatory for first offense 
cocaine/PCP/meth 
 Eliminate mandatory for second offense class 
cocaine/PCP/meth 
 Eliminate mandatory for second offense class C 
 Eliminate mandatory for second offense class D 
 Eliminate mandatory for sales of drug paraphernalia 
Strengthen minimum mandatories for opioid trafficking: 
 Make all federally scheduled synthetic opioids class 
A drugs in Massachusetts (if not otherwise classified 
in Massachusetts) 
 Include fentanyl, carfentanil and emerging synthetic 
opiates in trafficking weight ladder – mixtures 
containing these substances and weighing over 18g, 
36g, 100g, or 200g will draw the same minimum 
mandatory penalties currently applicable to mixtures 
containing heroin 
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 Modify fentanyl trafficking statute so that it applies 
to mixtures weighing over 10 grams that contain 
fentanyl. Add minimum mandatory of 3.5 years, 
effectively adding a special bottom rung applicable 
only to fentanyl to the trafficking weight ladder. 10 
grams gets 3.5 years under this section, 18 grams gets 
3.5 years (from the main opioid ladder) 
 Add a special minimum mandatory of 3.5 years 
applicable to mixtures of any weight containing 
carfentanil in any quantity but with the proviso that 
the commonwealth must prove knowledge that the 
mixture contained carfentanil 
Strengthen Protections for Public Safety: 
 Strengthen penalties for intimidation of witnesses 
 Broaden eligibility for witness protection programs 
 Strengthen penalties for solicitation of murder and 
other crimes 
 Allow district court prosecution of conspiracy, 
solicitation and intimidation 
 Strengthen penalties for corporate manslaughter 
 Strengthen penalties for high repetition of Operating 
Under the Influence (OUI) offenses 
 Broaden definition of inhalants that may result in 
OUI prosecution  
 Strengthen penalties for reckless homicide by motor 
vehicle 
 Create new crime of assault and battery on police 
officer causing serious injury 
 Create new crime of unlawful possession of credit 
card scanner 
 Expand crime of providing false information to police 
officer 
 Disclose findings of not guilty by reason of insanity in 
the same way as convictions for general employers 
and landlords. 
 Strengthen DNA collection procedures from serious 
offenders—collect forthwith upon conviction 
 Mandate better tracking and retention of rape kits 
 Mandate creation of police training program for bias-
reduction and de-escalation 
 
Reduce solitary confinement: 
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 Repeal archaic solitary confinement concept 
(“isolation”) and define more humane restrictive 
housing concept 
 Define minimum humane conditions for restrictive 
housing. 
 Require that the commissioner develop regulations 
“to maximize out-of-cell activities in restrictive 
housing and outplacements from restrictive housing 
consistent with the safety of all persons.” 
 Require that prisoners confined to restrictive housing 
shall, under regulations to be developed, have “access 
to vocational, educational and rehabilitative 
programs to the maximum extent possible consistent 
with the safety and security of the unit” 
 Require that prisoners confined to restrictive housing 
receive regular reviews to see if they are ready to 
return to general prison population and have an 
opportunity to participate in those reviews 
 Assure that correctional officers staffing restrictive 
housing facilities have appropriate training 
 Protect LGBTQ prisoners from arbitrary use of 
restrictive housing 
 Assure that those segregated from other inmates for 
their own safety are not placed in restrictive housing, 
but in conditions comparable to general population 
 Create a balanced oversight board with access to 
data, prison facilities and prisoners to report on 
conditions in restrictive housing and progress in 
reducing restrictive housing. The oversight 
committee will have no authority over individual 
prisoner confinement decisions 
Generally improve prison conditions: 
 Assure that transgender prisoners are housed with 
prisoners of the same gender identity unless it would 
endanger the prisoner or other prisoners 
 Require that all prisoners without high school 
diplomas have access to education programming 
 Require that all prisoners are assessed for substance 
use disorders (but do not require medically assisted 
treatment) 
 Preserve inmate access to regular in-person 
visitation—video visits permitted, but not in lieu of in 
person visits 
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 Expressly authorize creation of special prison units 
for emerging adults (ages 18 to 24) 
 Create commission to study LGBTQ prison health 
 Create task force to study correctional officer 
suicides 
 Study prison long distance phone costs 
Release prisoners who are permanently incapacitated 
and pose no safety risk: 
 Prisoners who are so debilitated that they do not 
present a public safety risk may petition their 
superintendent or sheriff for medical release 
 The sheriff or superintendent shall make a 
recommendation to the commissioner of correction 
 The commissioner of correction will determine 
whether the inmate is incapacitated and the medical 
release plan is appropriate 
 The parole board will supervise the released 
prisoners and re-incarcerate them if they are 
recovering contrary to expectations 
 Judicial review is only by certiorari 
Make it easier for people to get back on their feet:  
1. Reduce fees imposed on defendants  
 Eliminate counsel fee for juvenile defendants 
 No parole fee for the first year after release from 
prison 
 No probation fee for the first six months after release 
from prison 
 Make more fees waivable and standardize waiver 
language across fees 
 Streamline waiver process for probation fees – no 
written finding required 
 Improve procedural protections for people facing 
incarceration for non-payment of fines and increase 
rate at which fines are worked off from $30 per day to 
$90 per day 
2. Ensure that when state criminal records are sealed or 
expunged, national fingerprint records are also sealed or 
expunged  
 Require that offense based tracking number 
(OBTN) associated with a set of fingerprints taken 
at arrest is recorded in court files (not expand scope 
of fingerprinting) 
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 Ensure that when cases are disposed of, the 
disposition is transmitted to the national system 
(using the OBTN) 
 Similarly assure that sealing and expungement 
orders are transmitted for parallel action in the 
national system 
3. Make criminal records more private  
 Ensure that cases dismissed before arraignment do 
not appear on criminal records 
 Ensure that youthful offender cases tried in juvenile 
court are treated as juvenile instead of adult CORI 
 Accelerate sealing availability from 10 years to 7 
years for felonies and from 5 years to 3 years for 
misdemeanors. 
 Fix the glitch that causes resisting arrest charges to 
be non-sealable 
 Allow expungement of cases involving errors of 
justice 
 Allow expungement of non-serious cases up to age 
21 (both juveniles and young adults) 
 Exclude juvenile arrests from public police log and 
expunge public police logs if the court case is 
expunged 
 Raise threshold that defines felony larceny from 
$250 to $1200, so making more cases misdemeanors 
that can be quickly sealed or expunged (preserve 
ability of officers to arrest defendants in cases above 
$250) 
 Require that licensing authorities disclose in 
advance offenses that may be disqualifying 
 Confirm that sealed records need not be mentioned 
in applications for housing or professional licensure 
 Prevent employers from inquiring about sealed or 
expunged cases 
 Protect employers from liability for failing to know 
about cases that they are not permitted to know or 
inquire about under CORI law. 
4.Reduce entanglements with the registry of motor 
vehicles  
 No longer suspend licenses upon court defaults 
 No longer suspend licenses upon conviction of 
tagging or vandalism 
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 Assure that parents will not lose their license for 
non-payment of child support if the warning notice 
is going to a bad address (do not limit otherwise limit 
ability of the DOR to suspend licenses) 
Take better care of juveniles and young adults: 
 Raise minimum age of juvenile court jurisdiction to 
12 
 Do not raise age of criminal adulthood to 19, but  
 Expressly authorize creation of young adult units 
within Houses of Correction (18-24) 
 Expressly authorize designation of youth probation 
officers 
 Create task force to “to examine and study the 
treatment and impact of individuals ages 18 to 24 in 
the court system and correctional system of the 
commonwealth.” 
 Minimize harsh detention of minors (mostly 
codifying existing good practice)  
 Assure swift parental notification and appropriate 
handling upon arrest 
 Limit shackling in court room settings 
 Prohibit housing of juveniles in contact with adults 
 Prohibit the use of room confinement as a 
disciplinary measure for juveniles in DYS custody 
 Protect the parent-child relationship by 
disqualifying parents and children from being called 
to testify against each other in court (this does not 
apply to domestic situations and does not prevent 
parents from asking the police for assistance with 
their children if necessary) 
 Create a juvenile justice policy and data board to 
oversee and improve treatment of juveniles. 
 Create task force on trauma-informed juvenile care 
 Provide access to counsel at parole hearings for 
juveniles sentenced to life 
Improve transparency of the criminal justice system 
1. Mandate National Incident Based Reporting System 
for arrests, including racial data 
2. Juvenile justice policy and data board is to drive 
consolidation of information about juvenile contacts with 
the system 
TODD - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019  4:51 PM 
No. 2 2019] MASS INCARCERATION 215 
3. Require the Secretary of Public Safety to lead 
improvement of adult criminal justice data systems, 
creates adult criminal justice systems board 
4. Require expanded reporting on civil forfeitures. 
Better protect women in the criminal justice system 
1. Mentioned above: Mandate better tracking and 
retention of rape kits 
2. Allow vacatur of crimes committed by victims of 
human trafficking 
3.Create commission on justice involved women 
 Reduce and remedy errors of justice 
1. Empower stronger oversight of forensic labs and 
techniques 
2. Increase access to compensation for wrongful 
convictions 
 
 
 
 
 
